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Abstract
In a duopoly market, aspirations express how much sellers want to earn
given their expectations about the other’s behavior. We define individu-
ally and mutually satisficing sales behavior for given individual beliefs and
aspirations. In a first experimental phase, whenever satisficing is not pos-
sible, beliefs, aspirations, or sales have to be adapted. In a second phase,
testing the absorption of satisficing, participants are free to select non-
satisficing sales profiles. The results reveal that most people are satisficers
who, either mandatorily or deliberately, tend to adjust aspiration levels if
they cannot be satisfied.
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1. Introduction
Fifty years ago, Herbert A. Simon [18] published a paper that became a basis
for the theory of choice. Due to the informational and computational limits of
human rationality, Simon suggested a theory of bounded rationality based on
“satisficing”. More generally, the process begins with stating desired outcomes
(aspiration formation), continues with searching for actions that guarantee them
(satisficing), and ends up adapting aspirations in the light of experience (aspira-
tion adaptation). Satisficing with its three constituent sub-processes conforms
more to actual human behavior than descriptions built upon classical rational-
ity.
Though the literature drawing on the notions of ‘bounded rationality’ and
‘satisficing’ in order to explain phenomena at odds with the classical con-
cepts of perfect rationality is by now voluminous,1 only recently experimental
economists have started investigating satisficing behavior in laboratory. Some
such experiments try to detect aspiration levels and their adjustment by sta-
tistically analyzing search data (see, e.g., Zwick et al. [24]); others render the
satisficing approach applicable by directly eliciting aspirations (see Gu¨th [4 ],
and the references therein).
Our study differs from former experiments in two aspects. First, we consider
a duopoly market, i.e., a setting with strategic interaction, where beliefs about
the other’s behavior play a central role. Furthermore, within such a market, we
address the appealing (and hitherto neglected) question of whether satisficing
individuals change their aspirations whenever they cannot be satisficed or revise
other aspects of their mental model for deriving decisions.
The notion of “adjustment”, as it has been commonly used in theoretical
models of boundedly rational behavior, allows agents to revise one of the ele-
1In organization theory, for instance, there have been attempts to build theories of the
business firm incorporating bounded rationality assumptions since the 70s (see, e.g., Leiben-
stein [11], Radner [16, 17], and, more recently, Noreen and Burgstahler [15]). An empirical
test of how an optimizing search compares to a satisficing search has been conducted by, e.g.,
Markovitch and Rosdeutscher [13].
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ments of the decision problem at hand. For instance, in search theory, people
adapt their aspiration levels from one period to the next (see, e.g., Radner [17]).
In recent game theoretical models with satisficing players, aspirations are dy-
namically updated (Kim [10]) or actions can be revised over time (Napel [14]).
However, the fundamental question of which aspect of their boundedly rational
mental representation of the decision task individuals actually revise when their
aspiration level cannot be met has hardly ever been addressed.2 The experiment
reported here is designed to expressly investigate this issue.
To this aim, in a first experimental phase (consisting of 12 periods), we
enforce satisficing choices. In a duopoly market with various states of demand,
participants not only have to specify their own state-dependent sales behavior,
but also to predict their opponent’s behavior and form state-specific profit as-
pirations. If their action profile is not satisficing, in the sense of not allowing
the achievement of the desired period-profit in each state, subjects must revise
their beliefs, search for new sales strategies, and/or adapt their aspirations un-
til the latter can be (potentially) met. In such a way, we can investigate what
is mostly revised by individuals (beliefs, aspirations, or sales behavior) when
the satisficing requirement does not hold, and engage with the following ques-
tions: Will actors be willing to adjust their aspirations to given expectations
and own actions? Or will they stick to their aspirations, thereby modifying
beliefs and/or own actions?
Of course, we are also interested in whether or not individuals voluntarily
satisfice, i.e., if satisficing is absorbed after having been exposed to it.3 Note
that the question of whether satisficing is absorbed presupposes that partici-
pants are aware of what satisficing means. The latter is induced by phase 1
whereas phase 2 is meant to test the absorption of satisficing. In the second
2Tietz [20] and Tietz et al. [21] have imposed structured aspiration ladders for negotiators
and confirmed aspiration balancing (both parties concede equally often in aspiration steps) in
bargaining experiments, without eliciting beliefs or asking for action profiles.
3See Gu¨th and Kliemt [5] for a conceptual discussion of theory absorption, and Gu¨th et
al. [6] for an experimental analysis.
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phase (consisting, for the sake of consistency, of 12 periods too), we still in-
form our seller participants of whether or not their sales strategy is satisficing
given their elicited beliefs, but allow them to freely choose their sales quantity.
By this means, we can assess the absorbability of the satisficing approach for
decision problems with strategic interaction.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental duopoly
market and the satisficing approach. Section 3 illustrates the experimental pro-
cedures in detail. Section 4 presents the experimental results, and Section 5
concludes.
2. The stochastic market and theoretical analysis
We study a homogeneous duopoly market with stochastic linear demand. For
the sake of simplicity, especially to render the experimental scenario simple
enough, we abstract from (production) costs so that revenues equal profits.
The stochastic aggregate inverse demand function is4
pi = max{Di − xai − xbi , 0}.
Here, pi is the price as well as the unit profit in state i of the homogeneous
market when sellers a and b supply the amounts xai and x
b
i , respectively. Di is
a stochastic variable with discrete realizations 0 < D1 < D2 < . . . < Dn. To
limit the effect of probability transformations (Kahneman and Tversky, [9]), we
assume that all n (≥ 2) realizations of the stochastic variable Di are equally
probable. When selling xji in state i, seller j (j = a, b) earns
(1) piji = pix
j
i .
The equilibrium solution for this market is straightforward to derive and
is given by xji = Di/3, for j = a, b and i = 1, . . . , n, yielding the same
state-dependent equilibrium profit of (Di/3)
2 for both sellers. The symmet-
4Every (piecewise) linear demand can be reduced to this form by an appropriate choice of
the unit amount if the stochastic effect is a parallel shift of the demand curve. By imposing
pi ≥ 0, we avoid specific rules for the case of losses during the experiment.
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ric equilibrium strategy profiles are xa = xb = (D1, . . . ,Dn)/3. Denoting by
xˆj = (xˆj1, . . . , xˆ
j
n) seller j’s beliefs about her competitor’s sales profile, true be-
liefs can be expressed in the form xˆa = xb and xˆb = xa. Boundedly rational
sellers will not be able to predict their competitor’s strategy profile perfectly,
although they may learn to do so.
Let us, therefore, consider a seller j = a, b with given, but not necessarily
true beliefs xˆj regarding the other’s behavior in the n states of nature. If
Aj = (Aj1, . . . , A
j
n) is j’s aspiration profile, which complies with the natural
(even for boundedly rational sellers) monotonicity requirement Aji ≤ Aji+1 for
all i < n, then the action profile xj = (xj1, . . . , x
j
n) with x
j
i ≤ xji+1 for all i < n,
satisfies the aspiration profile Aj of j if
(2) [Di − xji − xˆji ]xji ≥ Aji for all i = 1, . . . , n.
We refer to (2) as seller j’s individually satisficing requirement.5 We say
that a vector x = (xa,xb) of strategy profiles is mutually satisficing if (2) is
fulfilled for both sellers a and b.
After sufficient trials, both sellers may entertain true beliefs. In this case, a
more stringent version of condition (2) holds, where mutual satisficing is based
on true beliefs x = (xa,xb) = xˆ = (xˆb, xˆa). Since rational expectations and op-
timality characterize strategic equilibria (see Aumann and Brandenburger [1]),
optimal mutual satisficing, based on true beliefs, is equivalent to equilibrium
behavior.6
3. Experimental protocol
The computerized experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Max
Planck Institute in Jena (Germany) in October 2006. The experiment was
5Note that (2) requires sellers to choose satisfactory actions in all n states of nature. This
captures an important feature of Simon’s theory: simultaneously doing more than one cog-
nitively demanding task weakens human capabilities and induces real difficulties in handling
even very simple choice problems (on this topic, see also Simon [19], and Lilly [12]).
6See, e.g., Lilly [12] and van Witteloostuijn [23] for earlier studies demonstrating that
maximizing and satisficing can lead to comparable results.
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programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher [2]). Overall, we ran four
sessions with a total of 128 participants, all being students from various fields
at the University of Jena.
Each experimental session consisted of two subsequent phases, with 12 pe-
riods each.7 In each period, the 32 participants of a session were divided into
16 groups a´ two sellers, so as to form 16 duopoly markets. New groups were
randomly formed in each of the 24 repetitions (strangers design).8 To collect
more than one independent observation per session, subjects were rematched
within matching groups of 8 players, guaranteeing 4 independent observations
per session and 16 independent observations in total. In order to discourage
repeated game effects, participants were not informed that random re-matching
of the groups had been restricted in such a way.
In the instructions, subjects were told that they would act as a firm which,
together with another firm, serves one market, and that in each period both
were to choose, independently, how much to produce and sell. Quantities had
to be integer numbers between 0 and 20. Participants were informed that their
period-profit would be determined via function (1) and, therefore, depend on
the realization of the state of demand and on the total quantity chosen by the
two firms in the market.
The variable Di could assume three equally probable values: D1 = 12, D2 =
24, and D3 = 48. Hence, the symmetric equilibrium requires the duopolists to
sell 4 in the worst state 1, 8 in the intermediate state 2, and 16 in the best
state 3. The implied state-dependent equilibrium profits are: pi∗1 = 16, pi∗2 = 64,
pi∗3 = 256.
To investigate our first major research question (i.e., whether satisficing is
7The instructions distributed at the beginning explained the rules of the first experimental
phase only. Written instructions on the second phase were distributed at the end of the
first one (a translation of the German instructions for the two phases can be found in the
Appendix).
8This should avoid the possibility of tacit collusion. See Holt [7] and Huck et al. [8] for
experimental studies showing collusion in partners design where the same subjects interact
repeatedly.
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achieved by revising beliefs, adapting aspirations, or searching for new own sales
strategies), in the first phase (period 1–12), we forced subjects, via a so-called
decision aid, to comply with satisficing requirement (2). In every period and
each duopoly market, besides choosing her own sales profile xj = (xj1, x
j
2, x
j
3),
each seller had to predict the sales profile xˆj = (xˆj1, xˆ
j
2, xˆ
j
3) of her competitor as
well as form her own aspirations profile Aj = (Aj1, A
j
2, A
j
3). Therefore, in every
period, participants had to fulfil three tasks and provide a total of 9 decisions:
(i) the quantity they wanted to produce and sell in each of the three states,
(ii) the quantity they expected the other to produce and sell in each state, and
(iii) the period-profit they aspired to in each state.
After having completed these tasks, it was checked by the software whether
satisficing requirement (2) held for all three possible states. Each participant
was then informed whether or not her stated profit aspirations could be achieved
in each state of nature, given her beliefs and her own sales choices in that state.
If this was not possible for some state, the participant had to go back and
revise one or more components of her decisions. Revisions were also allowed in
case of compliance with (2), though. Only when (2) was fulfilled for all three
states, the participant could confirm her specification and move to the next
period. Thus, in the first phase, when both seller participants have confirmed,
it is commonly known that the condition of mutual satisficing has been fulfilled,
although expected and actual choices may differ.
To assess our second major research question (i.e., whether individuals vol-
untarily use the decision aid, as required by absorption of satisficing), in the
second phase (period 13–24), we allowed participants to confirm their sales
profile even though, owing to their elicited beliefs, it was not satisficing.
To incentivize expectations as well as aspiration choices we paid participants
either according to their stated beliefs or according to their aspirations, with
both possibilities being equally likely. This method of paying should motivate
participants both to predict the other’s behavior as accurately as possible and
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to submit ‘true’ aspirations. When payments were based on stated beliefs, the
payoff of seller participant j (j = a, b) in selected state i (i = 1, 2, 3) was given
by:
W ji = 100− |xji − xˆji |.
We did not inform participants about the exact content of the above rule. We
just explained them that the closer their predictions were to the actual quantity
chosen by the other firm, the higher their earnings.
When payments depended on aspirations, participant j earned her aspira-
tion Aji for the selected state i if the actual profits sufficed to satisfy A
j
i , i.e., if
(3) piji = [Di − xji − xki ]xji ≥ Aji
with k = a, b, k 6= j. We refer to condition (3) as actually satisficing by seller
j in state i. If condition (3) was not met, seller j earned the highest aspiration
Ajl with pi
j
i ≥ Ajl . Paying aspirations rather than actual profits implements the
usual interpretation of aspiration levels, namely that one primarily cares for
achieving aspired period-profits.
At the end of each period, participants got individual feedback about both
duopolists’ sales profile xa and xb, the selected state of nature, the implied prof-
its, the dimension on which they were paid, and the resulting period-earnings.
4. Experimental results
In reporting our results, we proceed as follows. First, we present an overview
of elicited aspiration levels and sales behavior. Then we turn to our main
questions, and investigate what is mostly revised by our participants (beliefs,
aspirations, or sales choices) whenever satisficing is not fulfilled, and whether
people voluntarily maintain satisficing in phase 2 after having been ‘obliged’ to
follow it in the first 12 periods.
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4.1. General results
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on profits, choices, expectations and
aspirations over all periods, separately for the first (period 1–12) and the second
phase (periods 13–24) of the experiment.
[Table 1 about here]
Profits in the two phases are not significantly different (two-sided Wilcoxon
signed rank test, p = 0.980).9 As regards own sales choices, whatever the
phase, x1 and x2 do not significantly differ from the game-theoretical predic-
tions requiring participants to sell 4 and 8 in the worst and intermediate state,
respectively (p > 0.05 for both states in both phases, one-sided Wilcoxon signed
rank test). In contrast, in the best state 3, participants undersell as compared
to the benchmark solution of 16 (p = 0.029 in both phases).
Beliefs about the competitor’s sales amount, in general, are not accurate,
but systematically below actual choices (in phase 1: p < 0.001 in all three
states; in phase 2: p < 0.02 in all states; one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank
test). Subjects best respond to the expected quantity of the other firm in the
intermediate state 2, whatever the phase, and in the worst state 1 in phase 2
(p > 0.28 always; Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing computed best replies
to actual choices). However, the best state 3 and the worst state 1 in phase 1
trigger choices that are significantly lower than the quantities best responding
to expectations (p < 0.005 for all three comparisons). Such finding already
suggests that our participants are not always able to make optimizing choices.
Fig. 1 relies on independent observations to draw boxplots of aspirations
across periods for each state in both phases. In phase 1, if we consider all 12
periods, aspirations exhibit a (slightly) increasing and significant time trend
whatever the state of nature (Spearman’s correlation coefficients between as-
pirations and “periods 1–12 ” are 0.267, 0.322 and 0.408 for states 1, 2 and 3,
respectively; p < 0.001 always). Yet, for states 1 and 2 the aspiration trend
9Unless otherwise stated, all statistical tests are based on the 16 independent observations.
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stays rather constant after the fourth period (Spearman’s ρ between aspirations
and “periods 5–12 ” are 0.047 and 0.001 for states 1, and 2; p > 0.10 always).
As to phase 2, aspirations in states 1 and 2 increase to a very small degree over
all periods (ρ = 0.151 for state 1, and ρ = 0.126 for state 2; both p < 0.05),
whereas aspirations in state 3 are stable (ρ = 0.016, p = 0.409).10 Further-
more, as suggested also by Table 1, for each state of nature, aspirations are
significantly lower in phase 1 than in phase 2 (p < 0.001 for all three states;
one-sided Wilcoxon test). Participants become “more demanding”, in the sense
of improving their aspired period-profit, in the second 12 periods.
[Fig. 1 about here]
Looking at the spread of aspiration levels over time, we find that the gap
between profit aspirations in the best and worst state increases significantly
over the 12 periods of phase 1 (denoting by Ai the average aspirations in state
i, with averages over players for each matching group, Spearman’s ρ between
A3−A1 and “periods 1–12 ”, in phase 1, is 0.402, p < 0.001). The same applies
to the development of the spread between aspirations in the intermediate state
2 and aspirations in either the best or the worst state in phase 1 (ρA3−A2 =
0.384, ρA2−A1 = 0.306; p < 0.001 in both cases). Over the last 8 periods,
the gap between aspirations in the best state 3 and either other state still
widens, though to a smaller degree (ρ between A3 − A1 and “periods 5–12 ” is
0.192; ρ between A3−A2 and “periods 5–12 ” is 0.254; p < 0.03 in both cases);
however, the increasing time trend in the spread between A2 and A1 vanishes
(ρ = 0.014, p = 0.870). All considered spreads remain stable in the second
phase (ρA3−A1 = 0.003; ρA3−A2 = −0.034; ρA2−A1 = 0.02; p > 0.05).
4.2. Satisficing behavior
We now turn to our two main research questions. Subsection 4.2.1 presents
an aggregate data analysis of satisficing behavior. Subsection 4.2.2 provides
10The picture does not change if we consider only periods 5 to 12.
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details about individual behavior.
4.2.1. Aggregate data
What do participants revise more often when satisficing requirement (2)
does not hold? To answer this question, we separate the data according to phase
because compliance with satisficing is mandatory in phase 1 and voluntary in
phase 2. Fig. 2 provides the number of changes in own choices, expectations
and aspiration levels for each state of nature over all 12 periods of phase 1.
Fig. 3 provides the same number for phase 2.
[Fig. 2 and 3 about here]
Starting from phase 1, out of all the 4608 individual observations (32 sub-
jects × 3 states × 12 periods × 4 sessions), 3564 comply immediately with
requirement (2), meaning that the three profiles of interest, xˆj , Aj , and xj ,
are satisficing at first attempt for the same individual. Most of these imme-
diately satisficing profiles are confirmed, but a small number (134 or 3.76%)
is revised, with most of the revisions (72%) concerning own aspirations, some
(16%) expectations, and just a few (11%) own sales choices. The observation
that participants adapt mostly their aspiration levels when satisficing is not ful-
filled also applies to the remaining 1044 observations, which are not immediately
satisficing and, thus, must be revised. Among these observations, aspirations
are changed most often (66%), followed by own actions and expectations (both
around 17%).11 Participants seem to encounter particular difficulties in com-
plying with satisficing in the worst scenario, where the number of satisficing
choice is 1311, which compares to 1340 (1441) satisficing choices in state 2 (3).
Turning to the second phase, where satisficing was voluntary, we find that
out of the 1368 observations which were informed to be not satisficing, 150
decide to revise some aspects of their decision. As suggested by Fig. 3, also
in phase 2, aspirations are revised more often (62% of the times) than one’s
11Considering only the last 8 periods does not qualitatively alter the ranking: aspirations
are changed 61% of the time, expectations 21%, and own actions 17%.
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own and expected sales, which are modified at a similar frequency (expected
sales: 21%; own sales: 17%).
The latter observation indicates that some individuals are willing to adjust
their own aspiration levels so as to render their choices satisficing. This leads us
to our second major research question: Do participants deliberately maintain
satisficing in the second phase? Fig. 4 displays the frequency of choices that
are satisficing for all three states simultaneously and for only one state across
all 12 periods of phase 2.
[Fig. 4 about here]
In each single period, the frequency of satisficing is above 60%, and satis-
ficing choices are more frequent in the best state 3 than in the other two states
(on average, 1394 in state 3 vs. 1175 and 1173 in states 1 and 2, respectively).
Overall, 3240 observations (out of 4608) are satisficing. Thus, on average, 70%
of the participants comply with satisficing requirement (2) without being forced
to do so. Moreover, the proportion of satisficing action profiles stays rather con-
stant over time (Spearman’s correlation coefficients between satisficing action
profiles and periods is 0.164, p = 0.604).
According to satisficing requirement (2), aspirations must be not greater
than expected profits. It is therefore instructive to investigate how aspirations
compare to expected profits, and check whether or not the former converge to
the latter. Fig. 5 and 6 display the time path of aspirations and expected profits
over all 12 periods of phase 1 and phase 2, respectively. The sample for phase
2 includes only satisficing choices, i.e., choices that comply with (2).
[Fig. 5 and 6 about here]
For each state of nature, whatever the phase, aspirations lie constantly
below expected profits. Wilcoxon signed rank tests (two-sided) confirm that in
each phase and for each state, participants’ elicited aspirations are significantly
lower than their expected profits (p < 0.001 for all six comparisons). Thus,
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subjects aspire to profits which are significantly smaller than those they might
aim for, given their beliefs about the opponent’s behavior. In other words,
participants satisfice rather than maximize, thereby contradicting models based
on an intermediate level of rationality, such as “belief learning” (Fudenberg and
Levine [3], Young [22]).
According to Fig. 5, in phase 1, aspirations move towards expected profits
for each state of nature. Indicating by E(pii) the average expected profit in state
i = 1, 2, 3 (with average over players per matching group), and recalling that Ai
denotes the average aspirations in state i, a correlation analysis confirms that
the gap between E(pii) and Ai shrinks significantly over time for all states i
(Spearman’s ρ = −0.306, −0.474 and −0.489 for states 1, 2 and 3, respectively;
p < 0.001). Turning to phase 2, we find that the gap between expected profits
and aspirations stays rather constant over time (Spearman’s ρ = 0.027, −0.059
and −0.017 for states 1, 2 and 3, respectively; p > 0.40 in all cases).12
4.2.2. A closer look at the individual data
In phase 1, we classify individuals depending on how long they need to
satisfice at first attempt and stick to their prompt satisficing afterwards. In
particular, we distinguish subjects as follows.
1. Never satisficers: subjects who are requested to change some aspect of
the choice problem in each single period.
2. Later satisficers: subjects who do not achieve and maintain immediate
satisficing until period t, with t ∈ {9, 10, 11, 12}.
3. Intermediate satisficers: like the former category, but with t ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}.
4. Early satisficers: subjects who are immediately satisficing either over all
12 periods or at least over the last 9 periods.
12The results for both phases do not qualitatively change if we take into account only periods
5–12; the magnitude of the coefficient ρ just becomes a little smaller in absolute value in phase
1 for each of the three states.
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In phase 2, where compliance with requirement (2) was willful, we refer cate-
gories to whether subjects satisfice or not.
1. Non-satisficers: subjects who never comply with requirement (2).
2. Weak satisficers: subjects who do not start abiding by and maintain-
ing (2) until period t, with t ∈ {9, 10, 11, 12}.
3. Moderate satisficers: like the former category, but with t ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}.
4. Strong satisficers: subjects who satisfice either over all 12 periods or at
least over the last 9 periods.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 reports the proportion of subjects who fall in each of the identified
categories for each phase. Individual data confirm previous aggregate analysis.
In phase 1, most of our participants are early satisficers (more than 40%), and
the proportion of those who satisfice ab initio and consecutively for at least the
last 4 periods is also rather high (about 20%). Only a few subjects (less than
5%) never comply with satisficing immediately. Some participants do not fall
in any of the identified categories: they immediately satisfice in some of the 12
periods of phase 1 in a random manner.
The individual data for phase 2 are also quite comforting for the satisficing
approach: 48% subjects spontaneously satisfice for at least the last two-thirds
of the phase (in particular, 37% behave satisfactorily over all 12 periods). Only
11% of the subjects (mainly, those “never satisficing” or “unclassifiable” in
the first phase) never obey requirement (2). Moreover, 29 out of 53 early
satisficers in phase 1 are strong satisficers in phase 2, and 18 out of the 24
intermediate satisficers in phase 1 are either strong or moderate satisficers in
phase 2. These results suggest that a non negligible number of individuals has
absorbed satisficing.
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5. Conclusions
To experimentally test the satisficing approach in a strategic setting, we relied
on a multi-period homogeneous duopoly market. In every period, seller par-
ticipants had to choose their own sales profile, predict the competitor’s sales
profile, and form profit aspirations for each state of demand. An individual is
said to satisfice if she achieves her aspired period-profit, given her expectations
about the other’s behavior. In the first experimental phase, we forced seller
participants to satisfice. In the second phase, we still imposed the satisficing
routine, but allowed participants to freely choose their sales strategy.
Our major results are that, throughout the experiment, the overwhelming
majority of seller participants adapts aspirations until they can be met, and
voluntarily maintains satisficing in the second phase. Aspirations are system-
atically below expected profits, suggesting that individuals do not form aspira-
tions by maximizing expected profits. Since the worst state of nature triggers,
overall, less satisficing choices than the other two states, participants seem less
often satisficing when there is little to gain.
More than 40% of the subjects can be classified as ‘early satisficers’ (they
immediately satisfice at least over the last 9 periods of phase 1), and 48% are
‘strong satisficers’ (they spontaneously satisfice at least over the last 9 periods
of phase 2). Thus, the experimental evidence garnered here suggests that people
follow boundedly rational requirements in duopoly markets.
There are several ways of extending our experimental design. Eliciting
point-expectations about the other’s sales amount has the advantage to allow
for comparisons between satisficing and optimizing (choosing the best reply to
one’s point-expectation). Its drawback is that one considers oneself as satisfic-
ing, disregarding similar attitudes for the competitor. To avoid such weakness,
one could replace expected sales by expected aspiration profiles: this would
allow each seller participant to check whether there exist sales constellations
implying one’s own and the other’s expected satisficing. More obvious varia-
15
tions may concern either the market situation, e.g., by assuming heterogeneous
products or not allowing sellers to condition on the state of demand, or the
experimental procedures, e.g., by changing how participants are monetarily re-
warded.
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Appendix A. Translated instructions (originally in German)
Instructions for the first phase (period 1–12)
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. From now on any communication with other participants is
forbidden. If you have any questions, raise your hand. We will answer your questions
individually. All participants receive identical instructions.
Throughout the experiment, you can earn money. How much you earn depends on your
decisions, on the decisions of other participants matched with you, and on chance. The
unit of experimental money will be the ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), where 1
ECU = e0.01. This means that 100 ECU = e1.
Detailed information on the experiment
In this experiment, you will have to make decisions repeatedly. In every period, you will
be randomly matched into pairs. The participants forming a pair will randomly change
after each period, so that the other member of your pair will be different from one period
to the next. The identity of the other participants you will get in touch with will not
be revealed to you at any time.
In the experiment, you have the role of a firm that, like one other firm (the participant
you are matched with), produces and sells one and the same product on a market. In
each period, you and the other firm in your pair have to decide, simultaneously and
independently, what quantity you wish to produce. You as well as the other firm in
your pair can choose to produce any integer amount between 0 and 20; i.e., your choice
of quantity must be 0, 1, 2, . . . , 19, or 20. In the following, we shall refer to the quantity
chosen by you as xyou, and to the quantity chosen by the other firm as xother.
In each period, your profit depends on a random variable D, and on the quantities
chosen by you and the other firm as follows:
Your period-profit = [D − xyou − xother]× xyou.
In words, we subtract the quantities chosen by you and the other firm from the random
variable D, and multiply the resulting amount by the quantity chosen by you. If the
sum of the quantity chosen by you and the quantity chosen by the other firm is greater
than D (i.e., if xyou +xother > D), your period-profit will be zero so that you can never
make losses.
The random variable D can take on one of three different values, depending on which
of three scenarios occurs.
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• If scenario 1 occurs, D will be equal to 12.
• If scenario 2 occurs, D will be equal to 24.
• If scenario 3 occurs, D will be equal to 48.
The three scenarios are equally likely, meaning that D = 12 with 1/3 probability,
D = 24 with 1/3 probability, and D = 48 with 1/3 probability.
The decision aid
To help you decide how much to produce in each period, we provide you with a decision
aid aiming at “satisfactory” decisions, i.e., decisions achieving your desired period-profit
in each scenario. In particular, in each period, the decision aid will guide you through
the following steps.
a. First, it will ask you to choose the quantity you wish to produce in each of the three
scenarios. Specifically, you have to answer these three questions:
• How much do you want to produce in scenario 1?
• How much do you want to produce in scenario 2?
• How much do you want to produce in scenario 3?
For each scenario, you can choose any integer amount between 0 and 20. Furthermore,
the amount you choose in scenario 3 must be not smaller than the amount you choose
in scenario 2, which must be not smaller than the amount you choose in scenario 1. If
you, for instance, decide to produce 10 in scenario 3, your production in scenario 2 can
be at most 10 (i.e., 10 or less); if you opt for a production of 7 in scenario 2, then your
production in scenario 1 can be at most 7 (i.e., 7 or less).
b. Then, the decision aid will ask you to predict the production decisions of the other
firm. Specifically, you have to answer three further questions:
• How much do you expect the other firm to produce in scenario 1?
• How much do you expect the other firm to produce in scenario 2?
• How much do you expect the other firm to produce in scenario 3?
For each scenario, your expectation about the other firm’s production must be an in-
teger number between 0 and 20. Furthermore, your expectation for scenario 3 must be
not smaller than your expectation for scenario 2, and the latter must be not smaller
than your expectation for scenario 1. If you, for instance, expect the other firm to
produce 13 in scenario 3, your expectation in scenario 2 can be at most 13; supposing
you expect from the other a production of 11 in scenario 2, then you expectation in
scenario 1 cannot be higher than 11.
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c. Finally, the decision aid will ask you to specify the period-profit you wish to guar-
antee yourself in each of the three scenarios. In particular, you will have to answer
three more questions:
• Which period-profit would satisfy you in scenario 1?
• Which period-profit would satisfy you in scenario 2?
• Which period-profit would satisfy you in scenario 3?
In the following, we will refer to the period-profits you find satisficing as your profit
aspirations. Your profit aspirations in scenario 3 must be not smaller than your profit
aspirations in scenario 2, which must be not smaller than your profit aspirations in
scenario 1.
d. After you have answered the 9 questions above, the decision aid will inform you
whether your stated profit aspiration in each scenario can be achieved or not. That is,
you will learn whether, given your own production choices and your expectations about
the other firm’s production, you can achieve your profit aspiration in each scenario.
e. If your stated profit aspiration cannot be achieved in some scenario, the decision aid
will ask you to revise your own production choice, your expectation about the other
firm’s production, or your profit aspiration for that specific scenario. You can modify
all three aspects above, two of them, or only one.
f. Only when you can achieve your stated profit aspiration in each scenario, you can
move on to the next period.
The decision aid will assist you in every period, i.e., in each period you must go through
all the steps mentioned above, and cannot move to the next period until the profit
aspiration in each scenario can be achieved by your production choices and your ex-
pectations about the other’s production.
Your experimental earnings in each period
Though your period-profit influences your experimental earnings, you are not paid
according to your period-profit directly. Rather, your experimental earnings in each
period will be determined as follows.
At the end of each period, the computer will randomly select one scenario and, thus, the
value of D in that period. You can be paid either according to the difference between
your expectation and the quantity actually chosen by the other firm in the selected
scenario, or according to your profit aspirations. These two possibilities are equally
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likely: with 50% probability your period-payment will be based on your expectation,
and with 50% probability your period-payment will be based on your profit aspirations.
If, by random choice, your payment is based on the difference between your expectation
and the quantity actually chosen by the other, then the smaller this difference, the
higher your payment. That is, the more accurate your expectation, the more you earn.
If, by random choice, your payment is based on your aspirations, the computer checks
whether, for the randomly selected scenario, your profit aspiration exceeds your period-
profit in that scenario.
• If your profit aspiration in the randomly selected scenario does not exceed your
period-profit, you earn an amount of ECU equal to your profit aspiration in the selected
scenario.
• Otherwise, the computer will check whether your stated profit aspiration in another
scenario does not exceed your period-profit in the selected scenario. You will, in this
case, earn the highest profit aspiration not exceeding your period-profit in the selected
scenario.
• If all your three profit aspirations exceed your period-profit in the selected scenario,
your earnings in that period will be 0 (zero) ECU.
The information you receive at the end of each round
At the end of each period, you will be informed about (1) the actual production amounts
chosen by the other firm in each of the three scenario; (2) the randomly selected
scenario; (3) your period-profit in the selected scenario; (4) your period-experimental
earnings as explained above.
Your final earnings
At the end of the experiment, your experimental earnings in each period will be added
up. The resulting sum will be converted to euros and paid out.
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions to ensure
your understanding of the experiment, and the functioning of the decision aid.
Please remain quiet until the experiment starts and switch off your mobile phone. If
you have any questions, please raise your hand now.
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Instructions for the second phase (period 13–24)
The only change with respect to the first part is that now you are free to decide whether
you want to make satisficing choices or not. That is, now, after having gone through
the step-procedures of the decision aid, you can
• either confirm the three production choices (one per scenario), although they do
not satisfy your profit aspirations
• or change any of them.
In the latter case, you will be informed of whether your final production choices allow
you to achieve your profit aspirations or not.
Your experimental earnings in each period will be determined as in the first part.
The information you receive at the end of each period will also be the same as in the
first part.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics on profits, choices, expectations and aspiration levels sep-
arately for phase 1 (period 1–12) and phase 2 (period 13–24)
Phase Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
1 (period 1–12) Profit 9.87 9.63 0.95
x1 4.06 3.87 0.42
x2 8.29 8.14 0.68
x3 15.11 15.49 1.08
xˆ1 3.67 3.68 0.28
xˆ2 7.57 7.55 0.61
xˆ3 14.08 14.21 1.14
A1 13.94 13.63 1.54
A2 55.37 55.77 5.39
A3 221.79 220.16 16.09
2 (period 13–24) Profit 9.80 9.61 1.14
x1 4.25 4.10 0.68
x2 8.47 8.25 0.91
x3 15.74 15.86 1.15
xˆ1 3.86 3.86 0.38
xˆ2 7.84 7.93 0.83
xˆ3 14.53 14.84 1.34
A1 21.38 20.51 5.77
A2 70.60 67.72 12.13
A3 239.87 239.80 28.82
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Table 2
Percentage of participants in accordance with each type
Phase 1 Phase 2
Never satisficers 5 Non satisficers 14
Later satisficers 26 Weak satisficers 14
Intermediate satisficers 24 Moderate satisficers 13
Early satisficers 53 Strong satisficers 61
Unclassifiable 20 Unclassifiable 26
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Fig.1. Aspirations across periods for each state of nature in both phases.
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